

SHAPING THE INDO-PACIFIC STRATEGY: QUADRILATERAL SECURITY DIALOGUE (QUAD) AND INDIA-JAPAN RELATIONS*

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ABSTRACT: *The "Indo-Pacific" area is the major stage of global challenges, with the resurrection and establishment of multilateral institutions, most notably the dialogue of the "Quadrilateral Security Dialogue" (QUAD) involving the United States, Australia, India and Japan. India and Japan are regarded as crucial "links" in the QUAD network. Japan is one of the nations that contributes significantly to the formation and promotion of the Indo-Pacific security system, of which QUAD is a prime example. India is an essential member of the QUAD group because of its geostrategic location in integrating the Indo-Pacific into a single area. As a result, this research will assess the role of India-Japan relations in the process of resuming QUAD operations. According to the report, QUAD's reform efforts are motivated by a desire to persuade nations through shared economic and security benefits, rather than relying solely on "like-minded" allies.*

KEYWORDS – *Japan, India, Indo-Pacific, QUAD, strategy.*

I. Literature Review

Group 1: Important geostrategic space of the Indo-Pacific region

The Indo-Pacific region includes the Western Pacific and Indian Oceans, with waters adjacent to Southeast Asia, and is an important geopolitical and economic space. Explaining the increasing role in the region recently, Gurpreet S. Khurana (2018) said that "Asia" in the phrase "Asia-Pacific" is too large and mainly emphasizes. The element is strongly "continental" rather than "maritime", so it is not fully inclusive. Gandhi, Perna (2019) emphasized "Asia-Pacific, which seems to only include Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia and the islands in the Pacific Ocean and ends at the Strait of Malacca, India stands outside this concept." The Indo-Pacific concept would address this issue and engage India in a "maritime role in Asia".

The central message of President Trump's trip when he came to power was about the Indo-Pacific region, clearly stated in the US National Security Strategy (National Security Strategy, 2017): *"The region This, stretching from the west coast of India to the west coast of America. America's interests in a free and open Indo-Pacific region date back to the earliest years of the American republic"*.

Group 2: India-Japan cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region

Research by (Dr. Phan Cao Nhat Anh, 2022) "Japan - India strategic cooperation" has given 3 reasons why the bilateral relationship between the two countries is limited and narrowed in the Cold War period. Firstly, geographically, while Japan is located in the Far East, India is located in South Asia. Second, the main security interests of the two countries are different. Third, economic benefits are different.

The reason why the two countries India and Japan come together is a common strategic concern about the rise of China, especially its foreign policy ambitions in the Indo-Pacific. Ocean (Albenese, 2022). The India-Japan relationship of (EFSAS, 2022) is developed based on three aspects: (1) diplomacy, especially through the signing of agreements and arrangements that create a common framework for (2) trade relations and (3) defense - security relations.

Regarding the economic aspect, Jain (2018) proposed three factors promoting ODA economic connections between India and Japan based on (1) the rise of China in Asia, (2) the economic stagnation in Japan and (3) cordial relationship between the leaders of the two countries.

In terms of security and defense, Boon (2021) has argued that although India's relationship with the US is considered the main hedge against China, India's deepening relationship with Japan is the strategic barrier. This can be clearly seen in how Abe called the India-Japan relationship "the most potential in the world".

Group 3: Impacts on the India-Japan cooperative relationship in the Indo-Pacific region

(i) *Regarding maritime security, freedom of navigation and aviation in the Indo-Pacific*. It can be said that the driving force of India-Japan relations in the Indo-Pacific region is to protect maritime trade routes (Albanese, 2022). (Asian Strategic Review, 2019) affirms that maritime connectivity is the key to connecting trade and security in the Indo-Pacific region.

(ii) *Respect international law*. India and Japan emphasize the resolution of disputes by peaceful means, in accordance with international law, including UNCLOS, emphasizing the need for common codes of conduct

for equal access based on the basis of law. international law (Emil Avdaliani, 2021). The rise of China poses a major challenge for India and Japan to maintain a security architecture that is beneficial to national interests (National Maritime Foundation, 2019).

(iii) *The role of balance of power in the region.* In the study of (Dhruva Jaishankar, 2019) it was pointed out that Japan and India identified 3 pillars in the Indo-Pacific cooperation framework: (1) disseminating and shaping basic values on the rule of law, freedom of navigation, free trade and promoting cooperation with countries that share the same principles, (2) Japan and India pursue economic prosperity through "connectivity physical", "human connection", "institutional connection", (3) commitment to promoting peace.

Research gap

Through the presentation of the above research situation, we can see the existing problems and issues that need to be further researched and supplemented, specifically as follows:

First, while previous studies often only paid attention to the deepening bilateral relationship between New Delhi and Tokyo in terms of economics and security. But there is little research on how India's policy towards Japan has become instrumental in promoting India's defense and geopolitical goals beyond Asia in the Indian context. emerged as a great power. In addition, previous documents only mentioned the context of Asian security between India and Japan, with few studies examining the policy perspectives of the two countries within the Indo-Pacific framework.

Second, previous research has mainly analyzed the India-Japan relationship at the regional level, with little attention to its engagement with multilateral geopolitical frameworks. Both countries have shown a deep interest in cooperating with other countries in the Asia-Pacific region to address their respective defense, security and economic concerns. In this regard, multilateral cooperation has the potential to create strong partnerships between countries with similar beliefs and goals in building an economic-security framework, as a new driving force. of Asia in the context of China's growing influence. But no previous study has deeply explored India's pivotal role in the success of multilateral initiatives like the Quad. In addition, research on this issue is limited, mainly focusing on Australia's perspective or Japan's perspective on the Quad without many topics evaluating India's perspective.

Third, in recent times, with India increasingly standing on the international stage, the growing national power in the face of Chinese influence and the decline of the US in Asia have not been mentioned yet. in the documents. There is very little literature studying the role of leveraging the strength in the India-Japan relationship to solve two issues, one is based on which India asserts itself as a great power in the Indian region. Ocean - Pacific, the second is to serve the needs of both economies and address contemporary security concerns.

II. THE PROCESS OF FORMATION, COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF QUAD IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION.

"While the humanitarian relief mission ended in mid-January 2005, a new seedling of the Quad framework emerged in the leaders' minds".

Harsh V. Pant (Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi)

QUAD 1.0: Honeymoon

The idea of forming QUAD started from the humanitarian relief campaign of four countries: the US, Japan, India and Australia during the 2004 earthquake and tsunami in the Indian Ocean region, causing one of the world's largest natural disasters. The most devastating natural disaster in history, killing more than 200,000 people in 14 different countries (Diehl, 2021). The beginning of the "Quadrilateral Security Dialogue" (QUAD) is commonly referred to as QUAD 1.0. In 2006, the government of the late Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe established the concept of "Arc of Freedom and Prosperity" in the vision of Asia-Europe Security Cooperation to promote freedom, human rights, and democracy (ASO - 2006). This idea and concept made strong progress in 2007, when Prime Minister Abe attempted to transform the four-nation response to the tsunami disaster into a more formal quadrilateral security dialogue mechanism. , with the goal of enhancing maritime security along the "Confluence of the Indo-Pacific Oceans" (Chandra & Ghoshal, 2018), while promoting cooperation between four democratic countries led by China's growing influence.

However, the "Honeymoon" in the Quad's early stages swiftly crumbled owing to two key factors: "like-mindedness" and "military cooperation". This is a "shortcoming" of QUAD, in addition to Prime Minister Abe's departure and Australia - under Prime Minister Kevin Rudd - departing from the organization.

The first reason why QUAD is in risk of being wiped away as soon as *it is founded stems from the disparities in interests and attitudes among its member.* The US, the superpower with a significant effect on America's survival and growth, is presently emphasizing counterterrorism above engaging with China. Following the horrific atrocities carried out by Al-Qaeda or the Taliban, America's terrorism strategy was

centered on them. America's participation was unclear in the initial stages. In terms of the remaining members, the changing of heads of government in Japan and Australia has further weakened QUAD.

The second reason is *the threat from China* - a factor that pushes like-minded partners of QUAD members to not meet expectations. Although QUAD members do not formally acknowledge it, this forum serves as a counterweight to China's influence in the Indo-Pacific region. In reality, India and Australia have very strong connections with China, and they actively cultivate commercial and trade links with this market of over one billion people. Evidence for this statement is the fact that Australian Minister of Defense Brendan Nelson visited New Delhi (India) in 2007, mentioning that QUAD only focused on trade and culture "to reassure China that the so-called quadrilateral dialogue with India is not something we are pursuing," demonstrating that the countries involved also want to avoid angering China. That is why QUAD members have been unable to reach a consensus on the China problem.

QUAD 2.0: The Revival of Quadrilateral Security Dialogue

The formation of QUAD owes a great deal to Prime Minister Abe and the Japanese government, but "America is the actual leading force," as demonstrated most clearly after QUAD was "revived" in 2017 (Panda, 2020). In the White House's Indo-Pacific Strategy (2022), it is clearly stated that "*The US will strengthen QUAD to become a leading force in the region and ensure that this group will solve important problems in the Indo-Pacific region*" (The White House, 2022). The parties' strategic character is conveyed by the notion of the geopolitical area "Indo-Pacific". Following the 2017 US-Japan bilateral summit, Japan, Australia, India, and the United States gathered in the Philippines to discuss steps to safeguard a free and open Indo-Pacific Ocean. This event is seen as the rebirth of QUAD version 2.0.


Japan's FOIP strategy includes three pillars: political, economic and security. "*Peace, stability and freedom of navigation in the Pacific Ocean are inseparable from peace, stability and freedom of navigation in the Indian Ocean. Japan, as one of the oldest maritime democracies in Asia, should play a greater role with Australia, India and the United States, in protecting the common interests of the two regions*" (Former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, 2012). *China and the Indo-Pacific* became prominent and created a strong sense that QUAD was a group of like-minded countries, established to counterbalance China.

There are many factors that influence the countries in QUAD to come closer together to achieve progress in institutionalization. *The first factor is China*. In the context of Beijing increasingly expanding its power, especially in the Indo-Pacific. In addition to each member state's concerns about China's assertiveness and ability to expand its influence, there are also concerns about the region's vulnerability to China's power due to regional security. For these challenges, no member country in QUAD or international organizations can independently solve them. In particular, no country wants to unilaterally confront China for security and economic reasons. For example, the case of India is a key country that also shares concerns about the rise of China. This country is also ready to act to address this challenge, but India remains outside the US alliance system. In the case of Japan, although it is a like-minded ally of the United States, it has historical reasons for limitations and reservations. Therefore, a multilateral mechanism like QUAD to join forces to contain China's rise is the optimal solution for member countries.

The second factor is the method of cooperation. By November 2017, QUAD was revived at a meeting of senior diplomats. Among them, four countries are on the sidelines of the ASEAN Summit in Milan, with commitments to maintain order and openness in the Indo-Pacific region (Ministry of External Affairs, 2017). The formation and upgrading of traditional bilateral meetings and security exercises have nurtured "mini-agreements", turning them into bilateral links between countries (Figure 1) (Buchan & Rimland, 2020). A typical example is that when he became Prime Minister of Japan, Shinzo Abe did not immediately support the establishment of QUAD but instead focused on strengthening bilateral relations between Japan - US and Japan - India, Japan - Australia. These are bilateral meetings in the form of 2+2 (defense minister and security minister) with other countries.


The third factor is the change in the cooperation model from the "hub and spoke" form to the new US alliance network (Figure 2). From the "hub-and-spoke" system with America as the center, satellites are formed that are surrounding spokes that have no close relationship with each other. The US and its allies have shared the security burden together, filling the power vacuum in the region. As a result, a new cooperation framework was developed with coordination mechanisms not only led by the US, but also based on non-US triangles such as Japan - India - Australia, India - Australia - France, India - Australia - Indonesia (Satoru Nagao, 2021). Each strengthened "bilateral branch" in the four-party association of QUAD will be an important foundation for countries to find a common voice, strengthening the links in QUAD through sharing common values.

Figure 1: Illustration of the bilateral link between QUAD countries



Source: Hong (2022).

Figure 2: The change in cooperation model from "hub and spoke" alliance to network



Source: Satoru Nagao (2021).

It can be said that *QUAD is an informal cooperation mechanism*. The fact that QUAD is often referred to by many different names shows that it is not or cannot be an official organization, but also shows strategic ambiguity or constant adjustments in its priorities. It appears to be a "like-minded countries" discussion mechanism; no funding has been committed, and joint statements were just recently published. The informal character of QUAD enables countries to collaborate to tackle common issues. It does not need significant levels of commitment or the implementation of bilateral foreign policy in order to comply with any supranational institution without losing autonomy. The informal character of QUAD also helps member countries avoid causing tensions with Beijing. An openly anti-China QUAD is likely to harm future QUAD members because such an approach would reinforce Beijing's narrative that the QUAD is a military alliance aimed at "containment" and threatens China (Grossman, 2022).

III. INDIA-JAPAN MARITIME SECURITY COOPERATION IN QUAD

At the bilateral level between the sides of the Quad, the Japan-India axis always plays a leading role with a number of cooperation pillars that are much larger in scale than individual cooperation contents in the US-Japan and US-India axes. In addition, both countries are trying to develop India-Australia relations and Japan-Australia continues to improve towards independence without dependence on the US.

2.1 Maritime security cooperation through dialogue

In the joint Ministerial statement in March 2023, the QUAD group emphasized that "maritime security is the basis of development and prosperity in the Indian Ocean region and reaffirmed the importance of

respecting sovereignty and comply with international law (UNCLOS 1982) to respond to challenges to the rules-based maritime order” (Basu, 2023). In the Indo-Pacific Strategy Report, the Indian and Japanese Defense Ministries will “focus on maintaining a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific region, enhancing connectivity in accordance with the law and ensuring maritime security” (Department of Defense, 2019). From October 2017 until being upgraded to a Summit in February 2021, the QUAD group had 10 meetings with officials and Ministers. Most took place on the sidelines of regional forums or dialogues and did not produce a joint statement afterward. India-Japan maritime security cooperation in the QUAD group is mostly carried out through an informal diplomatic consultation process with other member nations. On the foundation of collaboration, the two nations debate how to address difficulties based on shared interests and viewpoints. To provide the groundwork for "cooperation to promote a free and open Indo-Pacific region, including support for freedom of navigation and territorial integrity" (US Department of State, 2021).

Indo-Pacific cooperation remains the focus of negotiations within the QUAD. In May 2022, QUAD's 3rd in-person Summit took place in Japan with the participation of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, US President Joe Biden, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese. The conference adopted a joint statement and identified goals and solutions in maritime security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. The joint statement clearly stated, “We welcome the new initiative, The Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA). This is a cooperation framework to respond to humanitarian and natural disasters. This is an official event marking a new transformation in QUAD's maritime security field.

2.2 Maritime security cooperation through joint exercises

Based on four-party talks, QUAD members actively encourage cooperation to safeguard maritime security in the Indo-Pacific area, with Japan and India playing an important role in the annual Malabar exercise. The Malabar naval exercise began as a bilateral exercise between the United States and India in 1992. The Malabar bilateral exercise between India and Japan occurred in 2009, 2011 and 2014. In 2017, Japan, India, and the United States conducted the Malabar exercise in the Bay of Bengal, including about 20 ships and approximately 100 aircraft from the three nations (Vietnam News Agency, 2017).

One of the factors promoting the return of the Malabar naval exercise between the four QUAD countries is China. China, with its growing naval power, has gradually become a concern for the region's maritime security situation. A joint military Malabar took place in November 2020 with two phases of deployment, officially marking the return of all four members of QUAD after nearly 13 years. Here naval forces including the Indian Navy and the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force “conducted a series of advanced training exercises, including air defense and anti-submarine exercises, activities related to aircraft, communications and ship supply at sea (MOD, 2020). In phase 1 of this a joint military, the Indian and Japanese sides focus on maritime activities, anti-submarine warfare activities, resupply at sea, and cross-flight operations (America's Navy, 2021). The second phase includes target training exercises, helicopter cross-flight operations, and artillery exercises (Table 1).

Table 1: Malabar exercise with participation of India and Japan in QUAD (2020-2023)

A joint military		India	Japan
Malabar 2020	Bay of Bengal , Eastern Indian Ocean	- Deepak class tanker INS Shakti (A75) - Rajput class destroyer INS - P-8I Neptune maritime patrol aircraft - INS Talwar F40 stealth corvette - INS Deepak A50 tanker	Takanami-class destroyer JS Onami (DD-111)
Malabar 2021	Philippine Sea	-Stealth corvette INS Shivalik F47 -INS Kadmatt P29 anti-submarine warfare corvette	- Helicopter carrier JS Kaga (DDH-184) - Kawasaki P-1 patrol aircraft
	Arabian Sea – Western Indian Ocean	- P-8I Neptune patrol aircraft - Satpura F48 stealth corvette	Destroyer JS Murasame DD 101
Malabar 2022	Philippine Sea	- Stealth corvette INS Shivalik (F47) - P-8I Neptune patrol aircraft	-The destroyer carries the JS Huyga DDH 181 helicopter - Destroyer JS Takanami DD151
Malabar 2023	East Coast of Australia	- Destroyer INS Kolkata - INS Sahyadri corvette	-Destroyer JS Shiranui

Source: Tom, Ashley, Blake Darshana & Tomohiko (2023) and Indian Navy (2023).

Although the Malabar exercise does not represent a formal military agreement. However, this is one of the useful paths and platforms to help strengthen cooperation and common interests in the maritime field among all four QUAD member countries. Maintaining annual Malabar exercises between the four sides. The participation of India and Japan in particular creates prospects for pursuing a collective deterrence and defense approach in the maritime domain in the Indo-Pacific region.

IV. INDIA - JAPAN ECONOMIC COOPERATION IN QUAD

India-Japan-Australia Supply Chain Recovery Initiative (SCRI)

Market-dependent economies, such as India and Japan, require resilient supply chain structures to achieve economic development and trade success. The US-China trade dispute followed by the pandemic and the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war over the past three years have proven the necessity to improve and expand and even diversify supply chains for continued commerce. As part of the Quad, India, Japan and Australia launched the Resilient Supply Chain Initiative (RSCI) in September 2021 as a response to address supply chain vulnerabilities that have resulted from epidemic. RSCI aims to create a virtuous cycle of supply chain resilience to ultimately achieve strong, sustainable, balanced and inclusive growth in the Indo-Pacific region. It also aims to expose gaps in the supply chain structure and address problems with the existing system. This goal will be achieved through dual approaches – sharing best practices in supply chain resilience and creating opportunities for the four member countries to explore the possibility of supply chain diversification their. Supply chain resilience could prove to be an important tool to protect lives, livelihoods and economies globally in difficult future situations.

Infrastructure development based on Japan-India cooperation in QUAD

The Quad are leaders in building “high quality” infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific region with complementary approaches that leverage both public and private resources to achieve maximum impact. Since 2015, Quad partners are said to have provided more than \$48 billion in infrastructure financing in the region (Strategic Front, 2018). This represents thousands of projects, including capacity building, across more than 30 countries supporting rural development, health infrastructure, water supply and sanitation, renewable energy production (e.g. wind, solar and hydropower), telecommunications, road transport in the Indo-Pacific region. After the pandemic, the two countries have bonded to promote practical cooperation in many fields to bring specific benefits to countries in strengthening health care infrastructure and building pandemic-resilient systems. Building on the results of the QUAD Vaccine Partnership, India and Japan signed a \$100 million loan between the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) and the Export-Import Bank (EXIM) of India in May 2022 (Pooja Bhatt, 2022).

Japan's ODA policy converges with India's Act East Policy, which seeks to strengthen connectivity between India, Japan and East and Southeast Asian countries. In addition to the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA), both countries signed the India-Japan Industrial Competitiveness Partnership Agreement in November 2021 to strengthen their bilateral special strategy.

Table 2: Bilateral trade in goods between India and Japan

Financial year	Bilateral trade in goods between India and Japan (Billion USD)					
		2018-2019	2019-2020	2020-2021	2021-2022	2022-2023
Indian exports to Japan	4,7	4,9	4,5	4,4	6,2	5,5
India's imports with Japan	11	12,8	12,4	10,9	14,4	16,5
Total bilateral trade	15,7	17,6	17	15,3	20,6	22
Balance of trade	-6,2	-7,9	-7,9	-6,5	-8,2	-11

Source: Ministry of Commerce Trade Data (2024)

India's bilateral trade with Japan totaled \$22 billion in the financial year 2022-23. Exports from India to Japan during the period were \$5.5 billion and imports from Japan were 16.5 billion USD (Table 2). Japanese supplies account for 2.3% of India's total imports and India's exports to Japan are 1.2% of India's total exports. This shows that there is still great untapped trade potential between the two partners. Bilateral trade engagement between India and Japan is below potential. Japan is India's 26th largest export market while Japan is India's 13th largest import supplier.

In recent years, Japan and India have identified many common interests in the Indo-Pacific region, mainly related to decoupling from China as economic partners.

V. CONCLUSION

After 10 years have passed, QUAD has been "revived" and focuses on the concept of "Indo-Pacific". In the context of today's free and open Indo-Pacific region, the development of QUAD is of strategic importance, not simply as an effort to counter a "rising" China but also maintain the balance of power and ensure some standards of "rules-based international order". Neither India nor Japan wants QUAD to become a military alliance aimed at openly opposing China. Both countries believe that QUAD is a positive and constructive agenda, so India and Japan expect that peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region should be respected; QUAD is not "against someone" but "for something".

In the QUAD group, besides the leading position and key role of the US, the roles of Japan and India also need to be highlighted in the context of the Indo-Pacific region. The formation and development from version 1.0 to the current revival cannot fail to mention the connection and upgrading role of Japan. For India is a vast continental power in Asia, capable of projecting power across the Indian Ocean when needed. On that basis, the India-Japan relationship is also given many catalysts to strengthen and expand in many areas of cooperation.

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